# Limits on the Power of Garbling Techniques for Public-Key Encryption

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#### Long-Standing Open Problem

#### ? One-Way Functions $\Rightarrow$ Public-Key Encryption

Not in a <u>black-box</u> way [IR89]

What about **<u>non-black-box</u>** methods?

### Black-Box Constructions [IR89, RTV04, BBF13]

A black-box construction of *Q* from *P*:



**Security**:  $Adv_Q$  breaking  $Q \Longrightarrow Adv_P$  breaking P

#### Common Non-Black-Box Techniques

- "Low-Tech" (OWF-realizable):
  - Garbling [Yao86]
    - Zero-knowledge proofs [GMR85]
    - Witness Indistinguishability/Hiding [FFS87, FS90]
- "High-Tech" (based on stronger assumptions):
  - Fully Homomorphic Encryption [Gentry09]
  - Functional Encryption [O'Neill11, BSW11]
  - Witness Encryption [GGSW13]
  - Indistinguishability Obfuscation [BGI+02, GGHRSW13]



#### Garbling Scheme

#### Decomposable/projective [BHR12]

$$(C, \text{seed}) \longrightarrow \text{Garb} \longrightarrow \tilde{C}, \{w_i^0, w_i^1\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$$
$$\tilde{C}, (w_1^{x_1}, \dots, w_n^{x_n}) \longrightarrow \text{Eval} \longrightarrow C(x_1, \dots, x_n)$$

Security: Sim 
$$\left(1^{|C|}, 1^{|x|}, C(x)\right) \equiv_{c} \left(\tilde{C}, \left\{w_{i}^{x_{i}}\right\}_{i \in n}\right)$$

#### **Our Main Question**

$$OWF + Garbling \xrightarrow{?} PKE$$

• OWF  $\Rightarrow$  Garbling [Yao86]

• CDH + Garbling  $\Rightarrow$  IBE [DG17] circumventing CDH  $\Rightarrow$  IBE [PRV12] Non-BB BB

### Our Main Result (Informal)



Same model as:

[Brakerski-Katz-Segev-Yerukhimovich'11] and [Asharov-Segev'15]

## Outline

- Problem and Motivation
- Separation Model
- Ideas behind the proof

#### Black-box Separations: Most Separations in Crypto





#### Constructions We Want to Rule Out





#### How Does Garbling Make Constructions Non-BB?



#### Treating OWF + Garbling as a Black-Box



#### Treating OWF + Garbling as a Black-Box



#### Main Theorem (Formal)

# There exists no **black-box** construction of PKE from (OWF, Garbling<sup>OWF</sup>)

#### Big Picture of our Approach



#### Previous Separation Results That Use This Model



vs. this work: Imperfectly complete PKE

#### Constructions Captured in This Model



- Garbling circuits with OWF gates
  - [Beaver96, LO13, GLOS15]

#### Constructions **NOT** Captured by This Model



- Garbling circuits with Garb/Eval gates
  - Falls under the monolithic framework of [Garg-Mahmoody-M17]

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#### How to Prove Black-Box Separations



# The OWF + Garbling<sup>OWF</sup> Oracle O (first attempt)

The oracle *O* consists of:

1. To realize OWF: Random oracle  $f: \{0,1\}^n \xrightarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^n$ 



Oracle *O* 

2. To realize Garbling<sup>OWF</sup>: "Ideal" Garbling Scheme for circuits with f-gates

 $(Garb^f, Eval^f)$ 

Where Garb(seed, 
$$C^f$$
)  $\xrightarrow{\$} (\tilde{C}, \{w_i^0, w_i^1\}_{i \in n})$   
And Eval<sup>f</sup>  $(\tilde{C}, (w_1^{\chi_1}, \dots, w_n^{\chi_n}))$  outputs  $C(x)$ 

**Problem**: *0* is too strong! We can realize VBB obf. using it

# The OWF + Garbling<sup>OWF</sup> Oracle O (right version)





• Any PKE can be broken with only poly-queries to O



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- Similar to techniques used in [GMR01,HR04]



## Our Approach (closer look)









**Solution:** Gen runs Enc(pk, .) "many times" then adds answers of Eval queries to  $Hint_{Enc}$ 







**Solution:** Enc runs  $Dec(\widehat{sk}, .)$  "many times" then adds answers of Eval queries to  $Hint_{Dec}$ 



#### Summary

- Main Result
  - OWF + garbling <u>for circuits with OWF gates</u> are insufficient for constructing PKE in a black-box way.
- Extensions in this work (not discussed in this talk):
  - OWF + garbling mechanisms for circuits with OWF gates are insufficient for constructing *constant-round* key-agreement protocols.
  - OWF + NIWI/NIZK for statements with OWF gates are insufficient for constructing PKE with *without assuming perfect correctness* (extending [BKSY11])

#### **Open Problems**

- Extension to ruling out PKE from if we allow garbling of the *garbling scheme itself*.
- Extension to ruling out key exchange with *polynomial* number of rounds from OWF + garbling.

#### Related results

• [BKSY11]: OWF + NIZK/NIWI ⇒ (perfectly-complete) key agreement



• [AS15]: secret-key FE  $\Rightarrow$  key agreement



#### Garbling Scheme for oracle-aided circuits

$$(C^{o}, \text{seed}) \longrightarrow GC \longrightarrow \tilde{C}, \{w_{i}^{0}, w_{i}^{1}\}_{i \in r}$$
$$\tilde{C}, (w_{1}^{x_{1}}, \dots, w_{n}^{x_{n}}) \longrightarrow Eval \longrightarrow C^{o}(x_{1}, \dots, x_{r})$$

Security: 
$$\exists$$
 PPT Sim : Sim  $\left(1^{|C|}, 1^{|x|}, C^{\mathbf{0}}(x)\right) \equiv_{c} \left(\tilde{C}, \left\{w_{i}^{0}, w_{i}^{1}\right\}_{i \in n}\right)$ 

- Key property of GC used:  $|\tilde{C}| \gg |C|$ 
  - So hard to find any  $\tilde{C}$  without calling GC



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#### **Problem for 2**: Enc does not know $\tilde{C}$ **Idea**: Let Gen help Enc





Can be emulated without asking O'

Gen queries

$$GC(C_1) = \tilde{C}_1$$
$$GC(C_2) = \tilde{C}_2$$
$$GC(C_3) = \tilde{C}_3$$

Enc(*pk*, *x*) queries  $GC(C_4) = \tilde{C}_4$   $GC(C_5) = \tilde{C}_5$   $Eval(\tilde{C}_4, .)$  $Eval(\tilde{C}_1, .)$ 









Hint: Contains "heavy learnable" Eval queries of E



• Key property of GC used:  $|\tilde{C}| \gg |C|$ 

**Problem for 2/3**: Dec does not know  $\tilde{C}$ **Idea**: Let Gen and Enc help Dec







Add Hint to sk



Enc

does not



#### The Idealized Oracle

#### *O* OWF + Garbling<sup>OWF</sup>

- We want oracle O to realize OWF + Garbling of C<sup>OWF</sup>
- How to realize a OWF?
  - Standard way: Use a random oracle f
- How to realize garbling of circuits with OWF gates?
  - This models non-black-box use of OWF
  - Solution: Use a garbling oracle (Garb<sup>f</sup>, Eval<sup>f</sup>) that garbles circuit  $C^{f}$



Oracle O'



Oracle O'



Oracle O'



![](_page_54_Figure_1.jpeg)

**Challenge**: Dec does not know C<sub>1</sub>

**Solution**: Gen adds  $(Garb(C_1), \tilde{C}_1)$  to *sk* 

![](_page_55_Figure_3.jpeg)