Towards Bidirectional Ratcheted Key Exchange

CRYPTO 2018

2018-08-20

Information Security Group

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RUB




ROYAL HOLLOWAY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON








- Alice and Bob communicate
- Active adversary








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
- Alice and Bob communicate
- Active adversary
- Long term communication
 - Local (full) state temporarily exposed








- Alice and Bob communicate
- Active adversary
- Long term communication
 - Local (full) state temporarily exposed
- Practical protocols w/o precise security definition
 - E.g., Signal 🤇





What is Ratcheting?


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
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
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




- Alice and Bob communicate
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


- Alice and Bob communicate
- Active adversary
- Long term
 communication
 - Local (full) state temporarily exposed





- Natural security notion
 - Definition based only on trivial attacks
 - Bellare et al. on unidirectional communication C'17
 - Bob cannot be exposed






Natural Security Notion for Ratcheting?

- Natural security notion
 - Definition based only on trivial attacks
 - Bellare et al. on unidirectional communication C'17
 - Bob cannot be exposed

Our models require and constructions provide *full* security under:

- Asynchronous
 communication
- Exposure of both parties





Agenda

- 1. The Primitive Ratcheted Key Exchange
- 2. General Adversary Model
- 3. Unidirectional Ratcheting \rightarrow Model and Construction
- 4. Sesquidirectional Ratcheting \rightarrow Model and Construction

5. Results



Natural Security Notion for Ratcheting? Modeling RKE **Construction Intuition** Natural security notion Definition based only on trivial attacks • Syntax: Hey Bob! 🎔 Hey Bob! 🎔 Initialization Darling? Love you 🎔 Love you 🎔 Darling? 1 year later? later? That's a secret! secret! Γhat's

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
• What is Ratcheting?

Results




Natural Security Notion for Ratcheting?

- Natural security notion
 - Definition based only on trivial attacks
- Syntax:
 - Initialization






- Natural security notion
 - Definition based only on trivial attacks
- Syntax:
 - Initialization
 - Sending & receiving






- Natural security notion
 - Definition based only on trivial attacks
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 - Sending & receiving






- Natural security notion
 - Definition based only on trivial attacks
- Syntax:
 - Initialization
 - Sending & receiving
 - Key exchange
 - Consecutive establishment of keys in session
 - ≠ Authenticated key exchange!






- Natural security notion
 - Definition based only on trivial attacks
- Syntax:
 - Initialization
 - Sending & receiving
 - Key exchange
 - Composition in Bellare et al. C'17





Three Variants of Ratcheting

- Bidirectional ratcheting is complicated
- \rightarrow Understand its components




 k_{A3}



Three Variants of Ratcheting

- Bidirectional ratcheting is complicated
- \rightarrow Understand its components:
 - Unidirectional key establishment




 k_{A3}



Three Variants of Ratcheting

- Bidirectional ratcheting
 is complicated
- → Understand its components:
 - Unidirectional key establishment
 - Alice initiates computation of new key
 - Bob does not respond




rc



Three Variants of Ratcheting

- Bidirectional ratcheting
 is complicated
- → Understand its components:
 - Unidirectional ratcheted key exchange (RKE)






Three Variants of Ratcheting

- Bidirectional ratcheting
 is complicated
- → Understand its components:
 - Unidirectional RKE
 - Sesquidirectional RKE
 - Bob contributes (but cannot establish keys)
 - Adds security


(sesqui = 1.5)





Three Variants of Ratcheting


- Bidirectional ratcheting is complicated
- → Understand its components:
 - Unidirectional RKE
 - Sesquidirectional RKE
 - Symmetric roles





Three Variants of Ratcheting

- Bidirectional ratcheting
 is complicated
- → Understand its components:
 - Unidirectional RKE
 - Sesquidirectional RKE
 - Symmetric roles
 - Bidirectional RKE
 = 2x Sesquid. RKE
 (extended version)



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Three Variants of Ratcheting

snd

snc

rc

sno

 k_{A1}

 k_{A2}

 k_{B1}

k_{A3} •

Unidirectional RKE (+ Exposure of Bob)

Sesquidirectional RKE

init

Bidirectional RKE

init

snc

snc

sno

*k*_{*A1*}

 k_{A2}

k_{B1}


 k_{A3}

rcv k_{A1}

rcv k_{A2}

rcv k_{A3}

snd



No responses from Bob Bob's responses only help to recover Symmetric roles (extended version)

rcv k_{A1}

snd **k**_{B1}

rcv k_{A2}

rcv k_{A3}




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- 4. Sesquidirectional Ratcheting \rightarrow Model and Construction

5. Results




- Active adversary
 - Control whole network traffic






- Active adversary
 - Control whole network traffic
- Analyze key indistinguishability
 - Multi-challenge real or random key
 - \rightarrow Guess bit $b \in \{0,1\}$






- Active adversary
 - Control whole network
 traffic
- Analyze key indistinguishability
 - Multi-challenge real or random key
- Model exposures of local state





- Active adversary
 - Control whole network
 traffic
- Analyze key indistinguishability
 - Multi-challenge real or random key
- Model exposures of local state
- Single session
- Init abstracted








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Modeling Unidirectional RKE



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


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What is Ratcheting?Modeling RKE Construction Intuition Results

Modeling Unidirectional RKE


Impersonation
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 on Bob





Modeling Unidirectional RKE


- Impersonation \Rightarrow No future Challenge on Bob
- Expose Bob \rightarrow Allowed in our model





Modeling Unidirectional RKE

- Impersonation
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 on Bob
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge






Modeling Unidirectional RKE

- Impersonation
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 on Bob
- Expose Bob

 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 (= if no previous
 active attack)





rcv


What is Ratcheting? Modeling RKE **Construction Intuition** Results

Modeling Unidirectional RKE

 k_{A1}

snd

- Impersonation \Rightarrow No future Challenge on Bob
- Expose Bob \Rightarrow No future Challenge if synchronous
- \Rightarrow Exposure of Alice (solely) "okay"



init


Adversary



Modeling Unidirectional RKE

snd

- Impersonation \Rightarrow No future Challenge on Bob
- Expose Bob \Rightarrow No future Challenge if synchronous
- \Rightarrow Exposure of Alice (solely) "okay"




init

Adversary




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
5. Results








- Expose Alice okay \rightarrow Public key crypto
- Expose Bob ⇒ No future Challenge if synchronous










Results






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What is Ratcheting? Modeling RKE • Construction Intuition

Results

- Expose Alice okay \rightarrow KEM: enc(pk) \rightarrow_s c k dec(sk c) \rightarrow_s k
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 - → Forward secrecy of Bob's state






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What is Ratcheting? Modeling RKE • Construction Intuition

Results

- Expose Alice okay \rightarrow KEM: enc(pk) \rightarrow_s c k dec(sk c) \rightarrow_s k
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 - → Forward secrecy of Bob's state
 - \rightarrow Divergence of states





Results

Constructing Unidirectional RKE

pk

pk'

pk''

snd

snd

snd


 k_{A1}

 k_{A2}

 k_{A3}

- Expose Alice okay \rightarrow KEM: enc(pk) \rightarrow_s c k dec(sk c) \rightarrow_s k
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 - → Forward secrecy of Bob's state
 - \rightarrow Divergence of states
 - \rightarrow Random oracle:









Results

Constructing Unidirectional RKE

- Expose Alice okay \rightarrow KEM: enc(pk) \rightarrow_s c k dec(sk c) \rightarrow_s k
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 ⇒ No future Challenge
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 - \rightarrow Random oracle:




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


Results

- Expose Alice okay \rightarrow KEM: enc(pk) \rightarrow_s c k dec(sk c) \rightarrow_s k
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge if synchronous
 - → Forward secrecy of Bob's state
 - \rightarrow Divergence of states
 - \rightarrow Random oracle:










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- 4. Sesquidirectional Ratcheting
 - → Model and Construction






5. Results




Modeling Unidirectional RKE

- Impersonation A → B
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 on Bob
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous






- Impersonation A → B
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 on Bob
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous






- Impersonation A → B
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 on Bob
- Impersonation B → A
 ⇒ No future Challenge on Alice
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous






- Impersonation A → B
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 on Bob
- Impersonation B → A
 ⇒ No future Challenge on Alice
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 until Bob recovered






- Impersonation A → B
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 on Bob
- Impersonation B → A
 ⇒ No future Challenge on Alice
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 until Bob recovered






- Impersonation A → B
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 on Bob
- Impersonation B → A
 ⇒ No future Challenge on Alice
- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 until Bob recovered





Agenda

- 1. The Primitive Ratcheted Key Exchange
- 2. General Adversary Model
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- 4. Sesquidirectional Ratcheting \rightarrow Model and Construction




5. Results



Results

Constructing Sesquidirectional RKE


Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 until Bob recovered





Results


- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 until Bob recovered
 - → Forward secrecy and recovery of Bob's state





Results


- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 until Bob recovered
 - → Forward secrecy and recovery of Bob's state
 → Send new pk





Results


- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 until Bob recovered
 - → Forward secrecy and recovery of Bob's state
 - \rightarrow Send new pk \rightarrow Divergence of states





Results


- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 until Bob recovered
 - → Forward secrecy and recovery of Bob's state
 - \rightarrow Send new pk
 - \rightarrow Divergence of states





Results


- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge
 if synchronous
 until Bob recovered
 - → Forward secrecy and recovery of Bob's state
 → Send new pk
 - \rightarrow Divergence of states \rightarrow Update key pair






Results

- Expose Bob
 ⇒ No future Challenge if synchronous until Bob recovered
 - → Forward secrecy and recovery of Bob's state
 - \rightarrow Send new pk
 - \rightarrow Divergence of states \rightarrow Update key pair









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







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




Agenda

- 1. The Primitive Ratcheted Key Exchange
- 2. General Adversary Model
- 3. Unidirectional Ratcheting \rightarrow Model and Construction
- 4. Sesquidirectional Ratcheting \rightarrow Model and Construction
- 5. Results









- Unidirectional RKE
 - KEM + ROM (+ MAC)

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
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- Unidirectional RKE
 - KEM + ROM (+ MAC)
- Sesquidirectional RKE
 - Key updatable KEM (+ signatures)
 - # up (sk T) = #crossing ciphertexts
 - \rightarrow Depth of HIBE practically bounded




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 - \rightarrow Bounded in ping-pong pattern
 - \rightarrow Alternative: key updatable signatures



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
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 - \rightarrow Bounded in ping-pong pattern
 - \rightarrow Alternative: key updatable signatures
- BRKE = 2x SRKE + OT signatures
 → Build SRKE, BRKE too complex!

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