On the Local Leakage Resilience of Linear Secret Sharing Schemes

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Leakage attacks can be devastating

Proposed Solution: Secret Sharing, MPC



A few full corruptions

All the servers?

Partial leak from all

Leakage Resilient Cryptography

[ISW03, MR04, DP07, DP08, AGV09, NS09, FRR+10, BKKV10, LLW11, BGJK12, DF12, BDL14, BGK14, GR15, DLZ15, GIMSS16 ...]

- Strong leakage models
- Specially-designed schemes

Are **standard** Additive

Secret Sharing Schemes

Leakage Resilient?

Limited General Results

Secret Sharing generically protects against weak forms of leakage.

[DDF14] Noisy Leakage

[BIVW16] Low approximate degree leaks

Leakage Model: Local Leakage



Leak **any** partial information about state.

Output of each f_i is short

Restricted form of Only Computation Leaks[Micali-Reyzin04, GR12, BDL14], Bounded Comm. Leakage [GIMSS16]

Is Local Leakage reasonable?

Local: Justified by physical separation

Shrinking: Timing, power, selective failures give limited information

Adversarial

Additive Secret Sharing



Completely random

$$s = s_1 + s_2 + s_3 + s_4$$



Random poly Q(0) =Shares are evaluations

Threshold: Degree + 1 points to reconstruct Is Additive Secret Sharing Local Leakage Resilient?

A. Not Necessarily. Field: \mathbb{F}_{2^k}



$$s = s_1 + s_2 \dots + s_n$$

One bit each leaks one bit of the secret!



Results Overview

Leakage Resilience of Additive & Shamir Secret Sharing

Application: Leakage Resilience of GMW protocol

Application: Local Share Conversion

Results: Additive Secret Sharing

Prime order fields \mathbb{F}_p are more leakage resilient

Thm.

Over \mathbb{F}_p , additive secret sharing is local leakage-resilient. $\Omega(\log p)$ bits of leakage, $\varepsilon = 2^{-\Omega(n)}$ distinguishing adv n: number of servers

Results: Shamir Secret Sharing

Prime order fields \mathbb{F}_p are more leakage resilient

Thm.

Over \mathbb{F}_p , high threshold $t = n - O(\log n)$, t-out-of-*n* Shamir scheme is leakage-resilient. $\Omega(\log p)$ bits of leakage, $\varepsilon = 2^{-\Omega(n)}$ distinguishing advantage



Conjecture. For large n, $\frac{n}{100}$ -out-of-n Shamir over \mathbb{F}_p is local leakage-resilient.

Why large *n*? Approximate Subgroup Attack



Random Secret s_1, s_2 completely random $s = s_1 + s_2$ $s \in \{0,1,2\} + \{3,4,5,6\}$ 0123456

Generalizes to const. servers

Application: MPC

Honest-but-Curious GMW w/ preprocessed Beaver Triples

Goldreich-Micali-Wigderson87, Beaver91

	Secret Shared Inputs
Preprocessing	Beaver Triples for product gates
Computation	Addition: Locally Add Shares
	Multiplication: Use Beaver Triples

Application: MPC

Thm. Over field \mathbb{F}_p , GMW Protocol with "Beaver Triple preprocessing" is leakage-resilient: a. (Corruptions) n/2 corruptions b. (Partial Leakage) $\Omega(\log p)$ bits of leakage.

Beimel-Ishai-Kushilevitz-Orlov12

Locally convert secret under one scheme to related secret under other scheme

Shamir → Additive (Secret unchanged)



Lagrange Coefficients. $s = \lambda_1 q(1) + \lambda_2 q(2) + \lambda_3 q(3)$

 $s = Q_1 + Q_2 + Q_3$

Byproduct : On Local Share Conversion

Homomorphic Secret Sharing (Boyle-Gilboa-Ishai16)





Techniques

Prime order: \mathbb{F}_5

No subgroups



Want: s is close to random

Techniques $s \in \{4,3\} + \{0,1,2\} + \{2,3,4\}$

Cauchy-Davenport Theorem: Over \mathbb{F}_p , $|A_1 + A_2| \ge \min(p, |A_1| + |A_2| - 1)$

Need: $A_1 + A_2$ is close to random on \mathbb{F}_p .

To show: For any
$$A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n \subseteq \mathbb{F}_p$$
 where $|A_i| \approx p/2^l$,

 $A_1 + A_2 + \dots + A_n$ is close to uniform on \mathbb{F}_p

Number Theory Techniques. Fourier Analysis over \mathbb{F}_p .



Prime order fields \mathbb{F}_p are better against leakage

Thm: Additive & High threshold (t~n) Shamir over prime-order \mathbb{F}_p are local leakage resilient.

Application: Honest-but-Curious GMW is leakage resilient.

Application: Local Share Conversion Impossibility results.

Conjecture: Shamir over \mathbb{F}_p is leakage resilient when t = n/2



Usually in Leakage Resilience

Given Leakage Model, Does ∃ Leakage Resilient Scheme? [Cite many works on leakage.]

Here: Given existing schemes, how Leakage Resilient are they?

Results:

Prime order fields \mathbb{F}_p behave differently from $\mathbb{F}_{2^k}!$

For large n (no of servers), Thm. additive secret sharing over \mathbb{F}_p is leakage-resilient to $\log p/_4$ - bits of leakage. **Thm.** For large $n, \& t = n - O(\log n)$ *t*-out-of-*n* Shamir secret sharing over \mathbb{F}_p is leakage-resilient to $\log p/_4$ - bits of leakage.

Q: How Leakage Resilient are

- Shamir & Additive Secret Sharing?
- GMW & BGW style MPC Protocols?

Why?

- Exist and are Used.
- Useful Properties: Homomorphisms.

Is Additive Secret Sharing Local Leakage Resili

A. Not always.



Guruswami-Wootters16: For Shamir, one bit each allow full reconstruction of secret.



To show: For any $A_1, A_2, ..., A_n \subseteq \mathbb{F}_p$ where $|A_i| \approx p/2^l$,

 $A_1 + A_2 + \dots + A_n$ is close to uniform on \mathbb{F}_p

Number Theory Techniques. Fourier Analysis over \mathbb{F}_p .

Application: Honest-but-Curious GMWs w/ preprocessed Beaver Triples

[x]: Secret Shared

Preprocess

Compute:

Secret Share Inputs Beaver Triples for product gates:

[x], [y], [z] [a], [b], [ab]

Addition: Locally Add Share [w] = [x] + [y]

Multiplication: $w = x \cdot y$. Use Beaver Triples

I. Compute and Publish [x - a], [y - b]

2.
$$[x \cdot y] = (x - a)(y - b) + [a](y - b) + (x - a)[b] + [ab]$$

Techniques

Doesn't work: \mathbb{F}_4

Attack: Leak lsb(share)

lsb(secret) = sum of leaks



Secret: 10 = 11 + 01 + 00



Leak reveals: Share's coset

The coset is a group.

Learn secret's coset.